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An intercept-resend attack on a continuous-variable quantum key distribution protocol is investi-
gated experimentally. By varying the interception fraction, one can implement a family of attacks
where the eavesdropper totally controls the channel parameters. In general, such attacks add excess
noise in the channel, and may also result in non-Gaussian output distributions. We implement
and characterize the measurements needed to detect these attacks, and evaluate experimentally the
information rates available to the legitimate users and the eavesdropper. The results are consistent
with the optimality of Gaussian attacks resulting from the security proofs.
PACS numbers: 03.67.Dd, 42.50.Lc, 42.81.-i, 03.65.Ud
Quantum key distribution (QKD) enables two distant
parties – Alice and Bob – linked by a quantum channel
and an authenticated classical channel to share a com-
mon secret key that is unknown to a potential eaves-
dropper Eve. For this purpose, Alice and Bob have to
agree on a proper set of non-commuting quantum vari-
ables, as well as a proper encoding of the key into these
variables. Common QKD setups use so-called discrete
variables (e.g. the polarization of a photon), thereby re-
quiring single-photon sources or detectors [1].
In this Letter, we shall rather follow an alternative
procedure, pioneered in [2, 3], which consists in encoding
the key into continuous variables (CV). Specifically, we
use a CVQKD protocol with coherent states intoroduced
in [4]. The action of a possible eavesdropper then appears
as added noise on the observed continuous data. More
precisely, line losses correspond to a restricted class of
attacks, often called beam-splitting attacks, which only
add Gaussian “vacuum” noise. Other attacks typically
add more noise, called “excess noise”, which may be non-
Gaussian. It is generally crucial to show that Alice and
Bob can measure these noises with the required accuracy
in order to ensure the security of CV-QKD.
In order to analyse these noises, we have explicitly im-
plemented several non-trivial actions of the eavesdropper
Eve, which are simple but general enough to include both
Gaussian and non-Gaussian features. These attacks are
implemented optically as partial intercept-resend (IR)
operations, in which the signal beam is either measured
and subsequently re-prepared, or is eavesdropped using a
beam splitter (BS). These attacks enable Eve to control
independently the two main channel parameters, namely
the loss (BS part) and excess noise (IR part), simply
by adjusting the intercepted fraction. They are therefore
much more powerful than a simple BS attack correspond-
ing to a pure line loss. We examine in detail how well
Alice and Bob can detect them in real operating condi-
tions. The experiment confirms and emphasizes that it
is crucial to properly evaluate the channel excess noise
in order to warrant the security of the present CV-QKD
protocol [4, 5, 6]. In addition, we explicitly measure the
information gained by Eve for a wide range of partial IR
attacks, and check that it never exceeds the bound based
on Gaussian attacks (with excess noise). This is in full
agreement with the security proof given in [7].
Our CV-QKD protocol is based on coherent states and
reverse reconciliation, as described in [4]. Alice sends Bob
a train of coherent states |x+ ip〉 where the quadratures
(x, p) are randomly chosen from a bivariate Gaussian dis-
tribution with variance VA. Bob randomly measures ei-
ther x or p, and publicly announces his choice. A binary
secret key is then extracted from the correlated continu-
ous data by using a sliced reconciliation algorithm [8, 9].
This protocol is well suited for practical QKD because it
only requires conventional fast telecommunication com-
ponents, such as InGaAs photodiodes or electro-optics
modulators. A full QKD setup with a typical repeti-
tion rate of 1 MHz can be assembled with off-the-shelves
components [10]. The security of the protocol is proven
against a wide range of attacks, namely Gaussian individ-
ual attacks [4], finite-size non-Gaussian attacks [7], and
Gaussian collective attacks [11, 12]. It will be sufficient
for our needs here to focus on the proof of [7], which
provides a simple analytical expression for the secret key
rates against non-Gaussian attacks.
General framework. The processing of a coherent
state via a Gaussian quantum channel can be described
as follows. Its amplitude is multiplied by
√
T , where
T ≤ 1 is the channel transmission, while its noise vari-
ance is increased to (1 + T ǫ)N0 at the output, where
N0 stands for the shot-noise level and ǫ is the so-called
excess noise (referred to the input). Assuming that the
limited efficiency η < 1 of the homodyne detector deteri-
orates Bob’s reception but does not contribute to Eve’s
2information (so-called “realistic mode” in [4, 10]), the
information rates can be written as
IAB =
1
2
log2
ηTVA + 1 + ηT ǫ
1 + ηT ǫ
(1)
IBE =
1
2
log2
ηTVA + 1 + ηT ǫ
η/
[
1− T + T ǫ+ T
VA+1
]
+ 1− η
. (2)
In reverse reconciliation [4], the secret key rate is given
by K = β IAB − IBE , where β is the efficiency of the
reconciliation algorithm with respect to Shannon’s limit.
All the quantities appearing in these formulas are known
or can be measured by Alice and Bob. In practice, Alice
and Bob must carefully evaluate T and ǫ in order to infer
the optimal attack Eve can perform, and therefore to
upper bound IBE . This is done by statistical evaluation
over a random subset of the raw data [10].
Non-Gaussian attacks. Let us consider a particular
non-Gaussian attack, namely a partial intercept-resend
(IR) attack: Eve detects and resends a fraction µ of the
pulses, while she performs a standard beam-splitter (BS)
attack on the remaining fraction (1 − µ). For the IR
step, Eve performs a simultaneous measurement of both
quadratures (Fig. 1), and resends a coherent state dis-
placed according to her measurement results. For the
BS step, Eve is assumed to keep the tapped signal in
a quantum memory and to measure it only after Bob
has revealed his measurement basis. For given chan-
nel parameters (T, ǫ), the optimal attack is known to be
Gaussian [7]. It can be achieved using an “entangling
cloner” [5], which simply reduces to a BS attack if ǫ = 0.
If ǫ 6= 0, the partial IR attack that we consider here is
not optimal, although it has several advantages for our
demonstration purposes. First, it gives Eve a very sim-
ple way to exploit the excess noise of the line in order to
gain more information; second, it provides the opportu-
nity to check explicitly the bound on Eve’s information
for non-Gaussian attacks, deduced from Alice and Bob’s
noise variance measurements as established in [7].
Let us emphasize that for a full IR attack (µ = 1), one
has ǫ = 2. This corresponds to the “entanglement break-
ing” limit in our protocol [5, 13], at the edge between the
classical and quantum regimes. No entanglement can be
transmitted through the quantum channel, and therefore
no secret key can be extracted. For a lossy channel, this
added noise gets attenuated, so the entanglement break-
ing limit may become difficult for Bob to detect. Thus,
as another challenge to our experimental implementation,
it is interesting to check whether Bob can detect this IR
attack and properly reject the transmitted key.
Experimental setup. We have realized the IR attack
using the device described Fig. 2. It is a coherent-state
QKD setup, working at 1550 nm and exclusively assem-
bled with fiber optics and fast telecom components. It
displaces a train of pulsed coherent states within the
complex plane, with arbitrary amplitude and phase, ran-
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FIG. 1: Intercept-resend attack. Alice prepares a random
coherent state, and Bob chooses a random quadrature mea-
surement with a random number generator (RNG). In be-
tween, Eve makes an heterodyne measurement of each incom-
ing quantum state, and displaces another generated coherent
state according to her measurement result.
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FIG. 2: Experimental setup. Alice generates modulated sig-
nal pulses. Bob measures a random quadrature with a pulsed,
shot noise limited homodyne detector.
domly chosen from a two-dimensional Gaussian distribu-
tion with variances VA = 36.6N0. The pulse width is 100
ns. The signal is sent to Bob along with a strong phase
reference – or local oscillator (LO), with 109 photons per
pulse. Bob selects an arbitrary measurement phase with
a phase modulator placed on the LO path. The selected
quadrature is measured with an all-fiber shot noise lim-
ited, time-resolved homodyne detector. A key transmis-
sion is composed of independent blocks of 50000 pulses,
sent at a rate of 500 kHz, among which 10000 test pulses
with agreed amplitude and phase are used to synchro-
nize Alice and Bob and to determine the relative phase
between the signal and LO (see [10] for more details).
Knowing this relative phase, Bob is able to choose an ab-
solute phase measurement, for example one of the field
quadratures x and p, with a software control loop.
Practical QKD requires that only a part of the dataset
is revealed for channel parameters evaluation. This fi-
nite set size introduces statistical fluctuations that can
alter the excess noise estimate. Therefore, security mar-
gins have to be considered when computing information
rates. In all the experimental curves shown below, the
number of sampling points for channel characterization
has arbitrarily been chosen to be 5000 (i.e. 13% of the
40000 available pulses) for illustration purpose, and may
be optimized for each value of the channel transmission.
Implementation of full IR attacks. To implement an
IR attack as in Fig. 1, one would need three homodyne
detectors and two modulation setups. To avoid unneces-
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FIG. 3: Variance of the noise measured by Bob that is pro-
duced by a full IR attack (µ = 1). We define the total
added noise (referred to the input) as χ = χ0 + ǫ, with
χ0 = 1/(ηT )− 1 denoting the loss-induced vacuum noise and
ǫ denoting the excess noise. The total added noise χ (stars) is
measured experimentally, while χ0 (crosses) is deduced from
the measured transmission (T ) and from Bob’s homodyne ef-
ficiency (η = 0.6). Then ǫ (plus) is obtained from their differ-
ence. The uncertainties margins on ǫ represent the standard
deviation of statistical fluctuations when computing over a
finite data subset (5000 points out of 40000).
sary hardware duplication, this attack has been split in
three phases, with the role of Eve being played either by
Alice or by Bob. First, Alice sends coherent states, and
Bob simulates Eve measuring the x quadrature of the in-
coming states. Then, the same operation is repeated with
a p measurement. To take into account Eve’s beam split-
ter shown in Fig. 1, the variance measured by Eve (actu-
ally Bob) is adjusted to be exactly half of Alice’s output
modulation. This calibration also virtually includes the
losses within the homodyne detector into the beam split-
ter, thus simulating a perfect heterodyne measurement.
Both x and p measurement outputs are then communi-
cated to Alice through a classical channel so that she
can simulate Eve resending coherent states that are dis-
placed accordingly. After this sequence, the correlations
between Alice and Bob are measured in order to deter-
mine the channel parameters. Since Alice and Eve drop
the quadrature not measured by Bob, our two-step im-
plementation of the interception is legitimate.
The excess noise referred to the channel input is mea-
sured by Bob for different channel transmissions, se-
lected with an amplitude modulator. For a full IR at-
tack (µ = 1), the excess noise is measured to be about
0.1N0 above the expected 2N0 entanglement breaking
bound (Fig. 3). This is due to the various technical
noises encountered throughout the IR process, which can
be independently determined from the experimental data
(mostly laser phase noise and modulation imperfections).
Since this technical noise is quite small, we also con-
clude that the imperfections related to the method used
to “simulate” Eve are negligible.
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FIG. 4: Variance of the excess noise in a partial IR attack.
Each point results from an average of the measured excess
noise for different channel transmissions (see the ǫ vs. T plot
of Fig. 3). The solid line plots the expected excess noise due
to an IR attack on a fraction µ of the pulses. Due to technical
noise, the experimental data are above this line, typically less
than 0.1N0 (dashed line).
Implementation of partial IR attacks. Because the
full IR attack reaches the entanglement breaking limit,
it is not the best for Eve to tap information from the
quantum channel. As explained previously, a more sub-
tle way for Eve to interact is to intercept and resend only
a fraction µ of the pulses, and to implement a BS attack
on the rest of the pulses. In this case, Eve can choose the
amount of noise she wants to introduce independently of
the channel transmission. This allows a complete channel
parameter control, which is not achievable with a simple
BS attack (ǫ = 0) nor with an IR attack where the added
noise is fixed for a given channel transmission.
An important point is that the probability distribution
of Bob’s measurements becomes the weighted sum of two
Gaussian distributions with different variances, namely
TVA + N0 for the transmitted data (BS) and T (VA +
2N0) +N0 for the resent data (IR), so the attack is not
Gaussian any more. Figure 4 shows the measured excess
noise for different interception fractions µ. Ideally, it is
given by the weighted sum of the excess noises in the IR
and BS cases, i.e., ǫTOT = µ ǫIR + (1 − µ) ǫBS = 2µ.
In our experiment, we have to add the technical noise of
variance ǫT = 0.1N0, which leads to ǫTOT = 2µ+ ǫT, in
good agreement with the experimental data.
For such an attack, the achievable secret key rate is
lower bounded by the information rate for an equiva-
lent Gaussian attack characterized by the same variance
and conditional variance of the data distribution [7]. The
Gaussian mutual information rate IgAB between Alice and
Bob can be derived from the noise variance measurements
with a Gaussian channel model characterized by the same
correlations. This can be compared with the actual mu-
tual information rate IngAB computed from the measured
data distribution in presence of the partial IR attack.
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FIG. 5: Mutual information rates for a non-Gaussian partial
IR attack, for T = 0.1, 0.25 and 0.9, with VA = 36.6N0,
η = 0.6 and a technical excess noise of 0.1N0. The mutual
information IBE is plotted for a Gaussian model with equiv-
alent excess noise (solid lines), as well as for a BS attack
(dotted lines), and for a partial IR attack (dashed lines). It
is compared with the Gaussian mutual information IAB. As
expected, the IR attack enables to exploit the excess noise,
giving Eve extra information above the BS attack. We show
statistical fluctuations (±1 standard deviation) corresponding
to a data subset of 5000 points per block, as on Fig. 3.
We find that the Gaussian mutual information IgAB is
lower than the actual mutual information IngAB , with a
very small gap between them (≤ 0.8% for modulation of
VA = 36.6N0) for any T and ǫ. Therefore, only the curve
IgAB (noted IAB) has been represented on Fig. 5.
On Eve’s side, Fig. 5 compares IAB with three pos-
sible values of IBE . The dotted line (I
BS
BE) is obtained
from a BS attack for the given transmission. With this
attack, Eve only makes use of the channel losses, as if
she was not able to exploit the excess noise. The dashed
line (Ipartial IRBE ) is obtained when, in addition to the BS
attack, Eve exploits the excess noise for implementing a
partial IR attack. This information therefore reads
Ipartial IRBE = µI
IR
BE + (1− µ)IBSBE , (3)
The experimental points shown over the dashed line are
obtained from this formula, using the measured informa-
tion acquired by Eve from the IR part of the attack IIRBE ,
and the evaluated information from the BS attack (dot-
ted line). The solid line (IgBE) is the optimal Gaussian
attack where Eve exploits the excess noise for implement-
ing an entangling cloner attack. The experimental points
shown over this solid line are the bounds on IBE deduced
from the measured line parameters, according to eq. 2.
These curves show the crucial role of the excess noise,
even if Eve does not implement the strongest attack. On
Fig. 5 one can actually read the tolerable excess noise for
a given channel transmission T , at the crossing point be-
tween IAB and IBE , confirming that Alice and Bob are
on the “safe side” when using the Gaussian bound [7].
In conclusion, we have implemented a family of quan-
tum attacks, namely partial intercept-resend attacks,
which allow Eve to exploit the excess noise and are thus
more general than simple “beam-splitting attacks” as
considered so far. Our experiment confirms that such
attacks can be successfully detected and eliminated by
accurately monitoring the variances of all (“vacuum” and
“excess”) noises of the channel. Therefore, the present
“real-case study” provides both a test and an illustra-
tion of the working principles of experimental CV-QKD.
It is also particularly important in view of the recent
proof [14, 15] that the optimal collective attack for a given
noise variance is Gaussian, just as for individual attacks.
Considering that our family of attacks spans all possible
relevant transmissions and noise variances of the channel,
the security of our Gaussian-modulated protocol remains
warranted under very general conditions.
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